Philosophy
Longtermism and the ethics of people who don't exist yet
12 min
An exploration of the philosophical argument that future generations deserve equal moral weight to those living today, and the intense debate over whether this justifies neglecting current suffering.
Listen on the app, request early access:
Show notes
Future individuals are not harmed by current choices because those choices are what enabled their specific existence.
Temporal neutrality suggests that pain occurring in one hundred years is as morally significant as pain today.
The Total View treats well-being as an additive ledger where trillions of future lives carry immense weight.
The Repugnant Conclusion suggests a massive population with mediocre lives is better than a small flourishing one.
Fanaticism risks diverting resources from current food insecurity to address tiny probabilities of future human extinction.
Weak longtermism balances our responsibility to the twenty-second century with primary obligations to people living now.
In this episode
- 1Intro1 min
- 2The Parfit Foundation: Neutrality Across Time3 min
- 3The Math of the Future: Trillions in the Balance3 min
- 4The Repugnant Conclusion and Fanaticism3 min
- 5The Presentist Critique: The Tyranny of the Unborn3 min
- 6Outro1 min
Sources
- William MacAskill on Longtermism - Philosophy Bites
- The ethics of ‘longtermism’ — what are our obligations to the future? - ABC listen
- Longtermism - Ethics Explainer by The Ethics Centre
- The Problem with Longtermism | ETHICS IN PROGRESS
- What is longtermism? The controversial idea, explained | Vox
- What We Owe the Present: The Perceived Morality of Longtermism and Helping Distant Future People
- Frequently Asked Questions | Longtermism
- Future Generations Problem | Philopedia
- The Scope of Presentist Objections to Longtermism | Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía
- Longtermism - Wikipedia
- Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles
- https://rintintin.colorado.edu/~vancecd/phil308/Parfit1.pdf
- An Introduction to Longtermism | Longtermism
- https://www.stafforini.com/docs/Parfit%20-%20Future%20generations.pdf
- Temporal Neutrality and the Bias Toward the Future* - DocsLib
- The Repugnant Conclusion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- Reasons and Persons - Wikipedia
- The Unimportance of Identity
- Non-identity problem
- Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles
- The Case for Strong Longtermism
- The Case for Strong Longtermism - GPI Working Paper June 2021 (2)
- What we owe the future | Will MacAskill
- The Moral Case for Long-Term Thinking
- The Nonidentity Problem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Winter 2023 Edition)
- Future People, the Non‐Identity Problem, and Person‐Affecting Principles
- The Nonidentity Problem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- The Nonidentity Problem (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Fylom generates episodes like this on any topic you're curious about.
Fylom episodes are researched and written by AI. Automated checks help catch inaccuracies, but episodes aren't reviewed by a human and AI can still get things wrong. Treat them as a starting point, not a source of record — more in our accuracy disclaimer.